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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

court of appeals looked to the words "sufficient information" and
determined that Bosma received adequate notice. It determined that
the purpose of notice is to prevent litigation and allow the violator to
correct the problem. Then the court interpreted point source to
include manure fields, reasoning that the purpose of the CWA is to
regulate all discharges, including those coming from land near a
drainage ditch. This conclusion, paired with ample evidence that
Bosma was aware the drainage ditch drained into navigable waters,
provided Bosma with notice of all closely related claims in regards to
the drainage ditch. Thus, notice to a person or company in violation
may serve as notice for all similar claims derived from the same source.
The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's finding that
CARE proved the existence of an ongoing violation. It considered
multiple violations over time as an ongoing violation unless Bosma
could prove that there was no likelihood of repeating the violation.
Repetition may be inferred by the trier of fact, or implied when
additional violations occur after the plaintiff filed suit. The court of
appeals rejected Bosma's argument that CARE had not presented
sufficient evidence to show he actually committed the alleged
violations, and that therefore, future violations could not be inferred.
It found CARE had proven the existence of past violations by
providing evidence of date-specific violations. The court also inferred
an ongoing violation in light of the particular facts of the case. The
DOE had cited Bosma for numerous violations in the past and Bosma
refused to obtain a permit for many years. Additionally, CARE
provided testimony, photos, and video footage showing that Bosma
placed deposits of manure in proximity to the water after CARE filed
suit. The court of appeals concluded that evidence of past violations,
in conjunction with evidence of existing violations, was a basis for a
reasonable person to infer that there may be continuing violations.
Because Bosma failed to provide sufficient evidence to the contrary,
the court affirmed the district court's decision.
Holly Shook
Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that: (1) individual farmers and state agencies showed
a genuine issue of material fact as to risk of injury-in-fact to confer
Article III standing; and (2) claim and issue preclusion did not bar
action against the Bureau of Reclamation).
Two farmers in the Central Delta Area of the San Joaquin River
("San Joaquin") and two California State Agencies ("State Agencies")
sued the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") and pursued a temporary
restraining order ("TRO") in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California to prevent flooding of fisheries unless the
BOR reserved sufficient water to meet salinity standards downstream.
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After the district court denied the TRO, the parties submitted crossmotions for summary judgment. The district court granted the BOR's
motion, finding the farmers and State Agencies lacked standing to sue
and that claim and issue preclusion barred their action. The district
court then granted permission for an interlocutory appeal to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to address standing and claim and
issue preclusion rulings.
The BOR operated the Central Valley Project in California, which
took water from mountain sources and delivers it to beneficial uses.
The New Melones Unit within the Central Valley Project consisted of a
dam on the San Joaquin that diverted water into the New Melones
Reservoir. California water rights permits issued in 1973 allow for
various uses of this dammed water. The amount of water released for
these uses affected the salinity level downstream, which in turn
affected certain types of crops. The Vernalis standard identified
acceptable salinity levels in the SanJoaquin.
In 1992, Congress passed the Central Valley Project Improvement
Act ("Act"), which included three important directives for the New
Melones Unit: (1) flooding fishery areas at twice the normal level; (2)
BOR management of 800,000 acre-feet of water for the fisheries; and
(3) supplementing water used for the fisheries. The BOR accordingly
adjusted its operations to divert water from New Melones Reservoir to
flood the fisheries in compliance with the Act, and the farmers and
State Agencies brought this action.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first addressed whether the State
Agencies and farmers had standing to sue. The State Agencies'
standing depended on whether the farmers could allege a sufficient
injury-in-fact to give them standing as individuals. The Ninth Circuit
articulated a three-prong standing test: (1) an injury-in-fact; (2) a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of;
and (3) a likelihood that the court could redress the alleged injury.
The Ninth Circuit focused its inquiry on the injury-in-fact requirement
after finding the farmers' alleged injury was fairly traceable to the
BOR's decision to release the waters, and that the court could redress
the injury by ordering the BOR to use different methods to comply
with the Act.
The Ninth Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, which held the threat of injuryin-fact was sufficient to confer standing. In applying this rule, the
Ninth Circuit found the individual farmers alleged a sufficient injuryin-fact by showing they faced a significant risk the crops they planted
would not survive if the BOR flooded the fisheries in compliance with
the Act. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the BOR's argument the
individuals must allege statutory violations to show injury-in-fact,
noting other circuits have held individuals can sue before the harm or
statutory violation occurs. It also disagreed with the BOR's claim the
farmers' harm was merely contingent, finding that while obligated to
consider contingencies, the possibility the BOR could change its
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course of conduct was not sufficient to prevent a showing of injury.
The Ninth Circuit found that because the individuals alleged a
sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing, the State Agencies also had
standing since their members could sue in their own right.
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the BOR's second argument that
claim and issue preclusion resulting from previous administrative and
judicial proceedings regarding the New Melones Unit management
barred the action. The Ninth Circuit stated claim preclusion applies
where: (1) prior litigation involved the same parties or parties in
privity; (2) prior litigation involved the same claim or cause of action;
and (3) a final judgment on the merits terminated the prior litigation.
Applying this rule, the Ninth Circuit found claim preclusion did not
bar the current action because courts will narrowly construe the scope
of the prior litigation to the "same transactional nucleus of facts."
Since the prior actions challenged BOR releases under different New
Melones plans, and not under the New Melones plan as adjusted to
comply with the Act, the Ninth Circuit held claim preclusion did not
bar the action.
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the BOR's claim that issue
preclusion barred the action.
The Ninth Circuit noted issue
preclusion applies where: (1) a judgment on the merits resolved the
issue in question in a prior suit; (2) the second action involves the
same parties or parties in privity; and (3) the second action is based on
the same cause of action. The Ninth Circuit held issue preclusion did
not bar the action, stating the "same cause of action" requires
"identical" and not "merely similar" issues litigated. Because the Ninth
Circuit found the prior action here was only similar because it
challenged BOR operations from 1995 to 1997, and the current action
challenged BOR operations under a different management plan in
1999, issue preclusion also did not bar the action.
JaredB. Briant

TENTH CIRCUIT
Bufford v. Williams, No. 00-6055, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13235 (10th
Cir.July 2, 2002) (holding that failure to establish a pollutant's point
source is insufficient grounds to prove a Clean Water Act violation).
Norman and Zula Bufford ("Buffords") sought to prevent
wastewater allegedly originating at Crescent Wastewater Facility,
operated by Williams, from leaching onto their property, located
adjacent to the facility. The Buffords claimed that the facility's
groundwater interceptor trench was a pollutant point source
damaging their property. The parties filed simultaneous summary
judgment motions in the District Court for the Western District of

